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GI Justice in Vietnam: An Interview with 
the Lawyers Military Defense Committee 
According to Catch-22, they can do anything you 
cannot stop them from doing. In a war zone, the range 
of anythings expands to diabolical extremes. The 
Lawyers Military Defense Committee originated to 
un-catch Gis snarled in court-martial prosecutions 
in Vietnam. 
Their mission has made the attorneys of LMDC about 
as popular with the U. S. Command as General Giap. 
Early this year one of LMDC attorneys representing a 
black GI charged with murder argued that the GI was 
being deprived due process of law because the U. S. 
Command prevented the LMDC from operating effectively. 
Because the command allowed no military telephone 
lines to the defense group, the attorney claimed, he 
had to try 233 times to complete just four telephone 
calls to his military co-counsel in the case. The 
command also refused to grant the group mail and 
priority travel privileges. A full-colonel military 
judge hearing the attorney's claims said he agreed 
that the GI's right to civilian counsel had been 
abridged "but that's just a fact of life in Vietnam." 
Since then things have gotten more pleasant for the 
LMDC. The difficulty of getting justice for service-
men in Vietnam remains. Several members of the group 
this fall discussed their difficulties and achieve-
ments in response to questions by the Yale Review 
of Law and Social Action. The following is a 
transcription of their discussion. 
The participants are: 
Henry Aronson, a graduate of the University of Wis-
consin and Yale Law School who did civil rights work 
in Mississippi for three years with the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund, Inc., and then for three years designed 
and directed the Manhattan Court Reform Project for 
the Vera Institute of Justice in New York City. 
David F. Addlestone, a graduate of the University 
of North Carolina and Duke University Law School who 
served for three years in the Air Force Judge Advo-
cate General Office and two years in the Public 
Defender Service for the District of Columbia. 
Dolores Dede Donovan, a graduate of Stan[ ord Uni-
versity and Stanford Law School, is a member of 
the California bar. 
Joseph Remcho, a graduate of Yale College and 
Harvard Law School where he studied under Charles 
Nesson, president of LMDC, has worked with a law 
commune in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Remcho said he 
went to Vietnam with the group to find out ''lust 
what military discipline did require in a war zone 
and just how well military justice operates there." 25 
1
: GI Justice in Vietnam
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1972
Aronson 
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How did the Lawyers Military Defense 
Committee (LMDC) come into being? 
During the spring and early summer of 
1970, Peter Haggerty, a young non-
lawyer, was actively working with 
servicemen stationed in the Boston area 
through a GI counseling center. He found 
a tremendous need for civilian lawyers 
to represent the center's clients, par-
ticularly those involved in cases with 
constitutional issues, conscientious 
objection, racial difficulties, and any 
related area which the military commands 
found particularly offensive. About this 
time, William P. Homans, Jr., an expe-
rienced criminal lawyer in Boston who 
was working closely with Haggerty's 
group, received a request from Vietnam 
to represent a black GI from Roxbury 
who was charged with premeditated mur-
der. Haggerty's knowledge of the need 
for civilian lawyers for Gls in Boston 
combined with this cry for help from 
Vietnam, triggering Homans and Haggerty 
to think about Gls in legal difficulty 
in Vietnam, particularly when the diffi-
culties raised issues of conscience, 
alleged "anti-military" conduct, or 
were related to constitutionally pro-
tected areas. Gis were without practical 
Rem~ho 
access to civilian lawyers. 
Homans and Haggerty quickly enlisted 
the support of Anne Peretz, who had been 
actively involved in several military-
related projects. Anne in turn drew on 
Professors Charles R. Nesson and John 
Mansfield of the Harvard Law School. A 
small amount of money was raised to 
finance a trip for Haggerty and Homans 
to Vietnam. Homans represented - and 
gained an acquittal for - the Roxbury 
GI. After the trial, he and Haggerty 
scouted the need for civilian attorneys 
in Vietnam and assessed the feasibility 
of practicing as civilians in a war 
zone. 
They returned with a strong sense 
of need, optimistic that civilian 
lawyers could function in Vietnam. 
Within weeks Homans, Nesson, Mansfield 
and Peretz added Professor Norman Dorsen 
of NYU Law School and Professor Edward 
Sherman of Indiana Law School to their 
planning group, incorporated themselves 
into the Lawyers Military Defense 
Committee, obtained funding commitments 
to support a staff of four lawyers and 
an administrative secretary for one 
year, and hired a director. In addition 
· to the Board of Directors another group 
of persons agreed to lend their names to 
LMDC and to help us if we needed it. 
They included Deans Abraham Goldstein 
and Burke Marshall of Yale Law School, 
Professor Louis Jaffe of Harvard Law 
School, Ramsey Clark, and John Pember-
ton, formerly director of the ACLU. 
Staffing was completed by mid-
October. I arrived in Saigon on Novem-
ber I with Susan Sherer; David Addle-
stone and Joe Remcho came out within 
weeks and Dede Donovan joined us in 
mid-spring. 
It was quite obvious that the only 
people who could get good civilian 
representation in Vietnam were those 
who could afford the five or ten thou-
sand dollars necessary to bring a lawyer 
over from the States, or who had com-
mitted an atrocity which had so much 
publicity value that a defense fund 
could be created or a lawyer would vol-
unteer for the publicity. It was our 
feeling that a GI, who has the right 
under the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice (UCMJ) to have a civilian 
lawyer, should not be deprived of that 
right when he is in the worst position a 
GI can be in - Vietnam. 
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What kinds of cases do you handle? trative processes to cover an unsupport-
~ble result - lifting of the con-
Addlestone We have been defending Gisin courts- troller's "ticket" on nothing more 
martial, representing them in discharge than unsubstantiated suspicion - is 
proceedings and, in general, giving them virtually uncontrollable. A federal 
advice in any area where an attorney can injunctive action would have been pre-
be helpful. We have advised conscien- mature and would only have served to 
tious objector applicants, servicemen insure that the Air Force covered their 
having problems with security clear- ass. We can only hope that their zeal 
ances, and Gis seeking to submit Article led to errors which can be picked up 
138 complaints - anyone having a legiti- later in litigation. 
mate complaint against the military in 
which the intervention of a civilian What did you expect to do when you 
lawyer could have an effect. There is no arrived in Vietnam? 
general pattern. 
Addlestone I know I expected to become involved in 
Donovan A good example of our cases is one I political cases. 
handled recently. It involved a young Why aren't you getting First Amendment 
man who had enlisted in the Air Force to 
learn how to be an Air Traffic Con- cases? 
troller - he wanted to make a life Addlestone 
career in that field. The Air Force sus- Political cases are extremely rare in 
pected him of using heroin, but they Vietnam for three reasons. First, there 
didn't have any evidence that would are few GI organizers here. Second, 
justify a court-martial or even an everyone is here for one year, which 
Article 15. 1 So they suspended him means everyone knows the date when they 
from his job. A psychiatrist and a are going to leave. When a person first 
doctor examined him and said there were arrives in Vietnam he starts counting 
absolutely no signs of drug usage, but from "365", and he just does not want 
the Air Force wouldn't return him to his to get in trouble. He realizes that if 
job without shuffling him through many he gets involved in political activi-
levels of administrative procedures. ties he can go to jail, and his tour of 
Meanwhile, months were passing - since duty in Vietnam will be extended. Third, 
he wasn't permitted to work, he lost not there is extensive drug usage, parti-
only his proficiency rating but also the cularly heroin. When Gis become de-
right to reenlist in Vietnam, which pressed, or when they are dissatisfied 
carries a tax-free bonus of about with their status, they find it easier 
$1,000. We called General Clay to com- to turn on to heroin than to turn on to 
plain and within a few minutes the 7th political activity. 
Air Force SJA 2 had called us back. 
Remcho That got things moving for a while, When you're a GI back in the United 
but then our client's command offi- States, and you get out of line, com-
cer, who had previously sworn that our manders can threaten to ship you to 
client would never be an Air Traffic Vietnam. In Vietnam, there is a similar 
Controller again, submitted a report threat available against Gisin rear 
saying that he had seen our client en- areas. And, in fact, most Gis are not 
gaging in "unusual activities". We doing the fighting; there are ten 
asked where and the commanding officer support troops for every guy in the 
said it was confidential information - field. So in Vietnam there is always the 
neither we nor our client could be told threat of being sent to a forward area 
what was in the report. to fight. 
At that point they shipped him back Actually, there have been a couple of 
to the States - we gave him the names of major demonstrations over here: one in 
some lawyers to contact, but haven't Da Nang on Easter Sunday this year with 
heard from him since. Of course, if the about 500 people; the other at Chu Lai 
Air Force withdraws his certificate, in June. Apparently the original plans 
he'll never be able to get a job in Air were for political speeches in support 
Traffic Control again. of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW). At the last minute, however, the 
Aronson No doubt an air traffic controller sus- Da Nang demonstration turned into a 
pected of addiction must be checked. "smoke-in"; there were good people 
Yet, the misuse of doctors and adminis- getting together, milling around on the beach, but no political &ctivity. In 27 
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truth, the only people who have done 
overt political acts are the blacks. 
There was one demonstration in Chu Lai, 
several months ago, with seventy to 
eighty blacks demonstrating before the 
commanding general's house against what 
they felt was racial discrimination and 
improper pre-trial confinement of 
blacks. The Army sent a one-star general 
out to handle them, but there were no 
apparent results and no punitive action. 
It's the blacks who are making what 
you call political statements, doing 
political acts. Most of these statements 
are not directed against the war but 
against treatment of blacks, and towards 
establishing black solidarity. I think 
it is clear, however, that opposition to 
the war among lower-ranked enlisted men 
throughout Vietnam is extremely strong. 
Very rarely will you find any expression 
of patriotism from anyone in Vietnam, 
especially enlisted men .. 
There are Vietnam Veterans Against the 
War organizers here in Vietnam, but it 
is very difficult for them to accom-
plish much. 
I think that all that W AW is trying to 
do is urge Gls to write to Congressmen; 
they are not willing to go much further 
than that, even though they organized 
the demonstrations that turned into 
smoke-ins. However, some WAW sym-
pathizers - Navy enlisted men - whom 
we're representing are now circulating 
a petition to Congress to end the war. 
They've been getting mixed responses 
from the various commands: one person 
was actually apprehended for circulating 
a petition outside a post movie theater 
and another was beaten up by a career 
NCO. A few others have been harassed 
and intimidated for signing it. 
The representation of these peti-
tioners is a good example of the kind of 
work we do. The Navy men came into the 
office stating their desire to circu-
late a petition urging an immediate end 
of the war in Vietnam. They felt they 
could collect thousands of signatures 
but they were fearful of, and at all 
costs wanted to avoid, getting into 
trouble. Consequently, we provided them 
with conservative advice, explaining 
their constitutional and statutory right 
to circulate a petition to Congress 
providing they did so on their own time, 
that they did not use government proir 
erty in reproducing the petition, and 





connection with collecting signatures. 
We then met with the Staff Judge Advo-
cate of the Navy in Vietnam, informed 
him of the petition, and obtained his 
assurance that the men would not be 
bothered in their efforts. While it is 
true that there has been some harass--
ment, it has been at low levels from 
hot-head NCOs acting on their own. The 
command has left the petitioners alone 
and the petition is making progress. 
Of course, one possible response to the 
lack of political cases would have been 
for us to attempt to generate political 
activity by organizing. But we feared 
that if we did so - if we became visible 
as political activists - the South 
Vietnamese government would withdraw 
our visas. 
Didn't you think you were going into 
Vietnam for big test cases? 
That's true, but I think we were also 
going in to help the individual GI as 
much as we could. We were and still are 
interested in constitutional litigation, 
particularly involving First Amendment 
rights. We haven't had test cases in 
this area because there is so little 
First Amendment activity here. We feel 
particularly close to the conscientious 
objectors, who get little other support 
here; certainly they don't get any from 
most chaplains and commanders. 
I really don't think we've changed 
our views very much since we got here -
we've just adapted to the kinds of cases 
that are available. 
The problem of the test case here is 
also that you get mooted out. Communica-
tion between here and the States takes 
so long that drastic changes in the case 
often occur before we can get it into 
federal court or to the Court of 
Military Appeals. Vietnam is not a good 
place for test cases, although we do . 
have a few, and a few more are 
developing. 
What kind of support has the U. S. 
military command in Saigon given to you 
in Vietnam? 
In Vietnam, if you are not attached to 
or invited by the military, you do not 
have privileges or access to military 
communications and logistic support, 
then you just cannot function. The U.S. 
command literally cut us off from all of 
this. They considered us to be a sub-
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Aronson 
versive organization, in Vietnam just to 
cause trouble. They kept arguing that we 
were in private business and, therefore, 
that they did not have to give us any-
thing; but in fact there are thousands 
of people in Vfotnam who have minimal 
effect on the military effort and yet 
receive all the logistical support they 
need. 
After prolonged negotiations, con-
gressional intervention, threatened 
litigation, and just plain head-banging, 
some changes did come about. An exten-
sive hearing on one case brought the 
forces of the press to bear on the 
issue; and the military judge, while he 
denied our motion, remarked that our 
ability to represent clients was being 
hampered by the lack of support. We now 
can fly on military airplanes. We are 
now allowed limited ,use of the Army 
postal system; we can receive in-
country 3 mail from clients and judge 
advocate general (JAG) lawyers; but it 
has to be sent c/o Officer in Charge, 
Foreign Claims Division. We find even 
this objectionable since we do not want 
clients writing us care of Officer in 
Charge - it raises all kinds of ques-
tions in a client's mind about who is 
reading his letter and for whom we are 
really working. 
We have tried to get a military 
telephone in our office. While we have 
access to a military line at the Foreign 
Claims office and we do receive messages 
there, it is inconvenient and not pri-
vate. Not only is the phone located a 
block from our office, but there are 
always Army personnel within a few feet 
listening to what we say. 
The Army's response to our arrival was 
a classic case of mismanagement coupled 
with a blatant display of the Army's 
disregard for servicemen's rights. As 
David indicated, we were denied access 
to all military transportation and 
communication facilities upon arrival. 
The Army, acting through the MACY 
{Military Assistance Command Vietnam) 
Staff Judge Advocate, General Abrams' 
lawyer, correctly assumed that if they 
could keep us off their aircraft, tele-
phones, and off of their mail system, 
then we could not communicate with or 
see clients. The MACV-SJA saw his 
mission as one of protecting the Army 
from us. He actually told a friend on 
Abrams' staff that we were part of an 
international conspiracy which reached 
from Saigon to Stockholm via Hong Kong 
and Cambridge, and which had as its pur-
pose the assisting of deserters in 
fleeing from Saigon to Stockholm. The 
idea is intriguing but not one we had or 
have contemplated. 
We carefully documented the obstacles 
being put in our way; then in a pretrail 
hearing for a case where we were repre-
senting a GI, we set out these obstacles 
to support a motion to dismiss the 
char~es of murder because the client was 
denied his right to counsel. The hearing 
was covered by the major media represen-
tatives ranging from the military news-
paper Stars and Stripes to Time 
and theNew York Times. As David indi-
cated, the judge did not rule in our 
favor, but the press response coupled 
with Congressional inquiries, caused 
the U.S. military command to reverse 
itself and to grant us reasonably free 
access to needed facilities. Further, by 
blatantly blocking us from the only 
means of communicating with and seeing 
clients, the SJA quite unwittingly 
created the issue which gave us visi-
.bility and brought us to the attention 
of every JAG lawyer and thousands of Gls 
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The attempt to closet LMDC further 
demonstrates the legal command's dis-
regard of servicemen's rights. The 
commands freely transport jugglers, Bob 
Hope, boob shows and countless other 
half-baked entertainers, missionaries, 
car salesmen, USO types, Red Cross 
workers and heaven knows who else from 
the DMZ to the Delta, putting them up 
in VIP quarters, providing them with pri-
vate planes when scheduled flights are 
not available, and otherwise affording 
them whatever the Army has to offer. On 
the other hand, civilian lawyers working 
in Vietnam at no cost to their clients 
were ruled ineligible for any kind of 
military support. I think the disparity 
in treatment says a Jot about the 
sincerity of the military in professing 
that every soldier "has a right" to be 
represented by a civilian lawyer of 
his choice. 
What have you done since you arrived 
in Vietnam? 
We have tried to set up some test cases. 
We have talked to a hell of a lot of 
people who come in our office just to 
have someone they can talk with on a 
person-to-person level. We have tried 
Donovan 
cases and been involved in administra-
tive discharge proceedings. 
We have been doing a great deal of 
work with conscientious objectors. This 
kind of thing seems to spread; we start 
working with one man from a unit, and 
frequently he'll bring in his friends. 
Many of the people here who would like 
to apply as conscientious objectors are 
afraid to do so since they think they 
are going to be sent to jail or to 
combat. And that is generally what 
happens to them. Apparently the Americal 
Division had a policy that if a GI indi-
cated he was a conscientious objector, 
they would give him a two-week crash 
program and ship him out to the field 
without a weapon as a medic. That tended 
to discourage conscientious objector 
applications. 
One battalion commander was asked if 
he had any conscientious objectors in 
his unit. He said, "Yes, I've HAD six: 
two are in jail and four are back on the 
line." 
I have been dealing mainly with con-
scientious objectors. While the actual 
numbers are small, the number of con-
scientious objectors on our docket has 
quadrupled in the last few months. I 
theorize that the increase is directly 
related to the standdown of the war and 
the recent South Vietnamese 
"elections." As the absurdity of the 
war becomes increasingly apparent, more 
and more Gls are beginning to perceive 
that their problems with this war exist 
on a broader scale - that not only this 
war but perhaps all wars are equally 
pointless and absurd. 
I have also tried a few cases involv-
ing illegal searches: the Fourth Amend-
ment appears to be somewhat diluted here 
in Vietnam. Perhaps it's just because of 
the attack on the heroin problem, but 
it's also because of a feeling on the 
part of the military that rights 
against illegal search and seizure can-
not be maintained in a "war zone." The 
Court of Military Appeals commented to 
that effect in the Goldman rehearing a 
few years ago. They might have a point 
in a real front-line situation (although 
from my point of view it would have to 
be a major emergency), but since most of 
our troops in Vietnam function in a 
support capacity, far frorp any combat, I 
see no reason why their Fourth Amend-
ment rights can't be just as strongly 
protected in Vietnam as in the United 
States. 
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Remcho None of us has been able to try as many chooses to go ahead. We advised perhaps 
cases as we'd like since we have both forty of these men to turn down the 
travel and communications problems. Article 15 - cases which we thought were 
Taking any case out of the Saigon area totally unfounded or could not be 
involves several days of travel, besides proven. In no instance where we have 
the work on the case. Once you are out advised that an Article 15 be turned 
of the Saigon area and working on a down has the service commenced a court-
case, communications are so difficult martial. Most of these Gis would have 
that you can only work on that one case taken the Article 15 as a lesser risk, 
or something else in the same geographic rather than chance a court-martial, 
area. You don't have anything like the jail, and a permanent federal criminal 
flow you have in the States. When I was recd rd. 
in Cambridge doing a lot of administra- In other cases referred to court-
tive cases, I could have forty or fifty martial by middle-level commands which 
cases on the docket at the same time. arose out of bogus fact situations or 
In Vietnam this is impossible. overreaction to minor incidents, we 
Are there hard statistics on the cases 
have gotten senior commanders to drop 
the charges or lower the matter to an 
you have handled since LMDC arrived in Article 15. In many other instances, we 
Vietnam? have referred clients we did not have 
Hard statistics - since November 1, 1970, 
time to represent to dedicated JAG 
Remcho · lawyers. It is this constant surveillance 
we've talked to over 800 people, either coupled with the ability to intervene at 
in the office, in the Long Binh Stockade, a variety of levels in a variety of ways 
or in the Da Nang Stockade. which takes up most of our time. It is 
We have asSisted about twenty con- impossible to keep meaningful box scores 
scientious objectors with their appli- on this type of work. 
cations. We have tried approximately 
Remcho Another thing we found useful is thirty courts-martial. Quite a few cases 
were resolved informally, and many cases referring people to military lawyers. 
were handled by giving advice on a one- Military lawyers are like lawyers 
time basis or by writing a letter on everywhere - there are medicore ones, 
behalf of the client. real bad ones, and some very good ones. 
One of the things we've been able to 
Aronson Hard statistics do not bttn to describe do is refer Gls to military lawyers whom 
the work of the office. e Army, and we know to be good. 
the Marines while they were here, 
attempted to use their justice system to Addlestone In some cases, what we have done is to 
accomplish what leadership had failed to be sure that the accused has been get-
do - effect discipline, eradicate the ting good advice from his JAG lawyer. 
drug problem, quell racial disharmony, Often the GI will not trust the military 
and otherwise cure the massive ills lawyer just because the lawyer is wear-
which plague these services. Our biggest ing a green uniform. We can give the 
contribution has not been in the 30 accused confidence in his JAG lawyer. 
cases we have taken through trial, but 
in the involvement in literally hundreds How do you select cases? 
of matters where people have come to us 
as the only independent, non-military, Addlestone When we select a case, our basic cri-
non-establishment legal resource avail- terion is: Does a civilian lawyer have 
able to the 200,000-plus Gls currently something to add to the case? We prefer 
serving in Vietnam. racial cases, cases involving command 
Approximately 100 men have asked our influence, First Amendment rights, or 
advice on whether they should accept cases in which a significant legal ques-
Article 15 punishment, which is non- tion is raised - that is, cases in 
judicial, informal, and not entered on which victory would mean more than just 
a man's permanent record, for an alleged victory for the accused. We try to dis-
offense. 4 Article 15 has been used cuss each case with the whole staff. We 
by some commands as a means of punishing do not take any cases defending Gis 
men for conduct that did not happen or where the victim is Vietnamese. 
cannot be proven. A man has a right to 
turn an Article 15 down, but he then Donovan In interviewing we'll usually take the 
exposes himself to being court-martialed case involving a client who is politi-
for the same conduct, if the command cally interesting, whether he is anti- 31 
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war, in VV AW, or a black involved in 
some of the black activities here in 
Vietnam. 
What is the status of military justice 
in Vietnam in comparison with the 
United States? 
There is probably very little difference 
in the quality of military justice in 
Vietnam in comparison with what the 
military provides in the United States. 
I'm not saying this to praise the Army. 
l think the"fact that there is very 
little difference between military 
justice in Vietnam and in the U.S. 
says some good things about the Army's 
willingness, and its obligation, to 
adapt military justice to wartime con-
ditions. But it also says some things 
about the argument that aplogists for 
the military come up quite frequently; 
that because the military fights wars, 
servicemen must give up - and when I say 
. servicemen, I mean service men and 
women - must give up the constitutional 
rights they would have as civilians. 
The main difference between the 
U.S. and Vietnam is logistic; getting 
witnesses, the accused and judges to-
gether in time to try a case. Cases are 
delayed to some extent, yet the Govern-
ment has shown a remarkable ability to 
get people together to try cases. It is 
very rare that transportation is not 
available to people who are traveling 
with court-martial priority - except 
sometimes us. Sure, everybody is in 
fatigues, you're in a hot courtroom, 
there may be helicopters overhead and 
you may on rare occasions have gunfire 
outside, but for the most part cases 
are tried close to the way they are 
tried in the U. S. 
I think temporary confinement facil-
ities here are deplorable, very often 
just a small box, eight by eight feet, 
with nothing in it but a blanket. But I 
haven't seen temporary detention facili-
ties back in the States; I suspect in 
some cases they are not much better. 
The UCMJ does work in Vietnam to a 
reasonable extent. However, decisions 
here are made more hastily. In several 
instances we have spoken with convening 
authorities and charges were dismissed 
which had been hastily referred to 
trial. Also, pre-trial confinement is 
being abused. Commanders are concerned 
with having their command in combat-
readiness; they want anybody who creates 




the way. Most Army lawyers are reluc-
tant - or have not thought - to raise 
issues of illegal pre-trail confinement. 
We have raised that issue and have been 
successful. 
The logistical distinction between 
trying a case in the United States and 
in Vietnam referred to by Joe is far-
reaching, particularly in complicated 
cases which do not go to trial for 
three to six months after the alleged 
criminal act. In "normal times" in 
Vietnam, 8% of the troops rotate every 
month. With the reduction of forces in 
Vietnam, that figure is often tripled. 
Thus 20 to 25% of the troops leave every 
month and many witnesses are simply 
lost. We have not tried one major case 
where both prosecution and defense has 
not been hurting for witnesses. The dis-
tinction is that the prosecution is a 
bit more diligent about getting their 
tracking and interviewing back home . 
Couple this disparity in resources with 
fragmentary leads to witnesses like 
"Brother Smily" and "Big Boy" 
and you find yourself at a considerable 
disadvantage. 
Sure, the problem in getting witnesses 
from the States is enormous. I was re-
ferring to in-country travel, but I 
agree with you about the witness problem, 
once a man has gone home. We can get guys, 
if we can show their testimony is 
necessary. My problem is with witnesses 
I have never talked to and cannot show 
how important they might be at trial: 
leads I cannot explore. 
What is the sorest spot in military 
justice in Vietnam? 
The system looks the worst when non-
legally trained individuals make arbi-
trary decisions in an attempt to disci-
pline Gls, rather than to seek justice. 
Within the framework of the UCMJ, 
the role of the Staff Judge Advocate is 
a crucial one. He is the legal adviser 
to the convening authority. He is 
usually a major or lieutenant colonel, 
and his commander is a general. The 
general writes the major's efficiency 
reports. Naturally, the SJA is going to 
base his legal recommendations on what 
he thinks the general wants to hear. If 
there is a strong SJA who will stand up 
for proper judicial proceedings and who 
will demand consistency in the handling 
of cases, there is an environment where 
the UCMJ works very well. On the other 
8





hand, if you have a weak Staff Judge 
Advocate, there is a deplorable situa-
tion. Of course, that could occur any-
where, but commanders in a war zone are 
more concerned with eliminating dis-
ciplinary problems than with justice. 
A problem in Vietnam is the tre-
mendous case load that the good JAG 
lawyers are carrying. They have a Jot 
of pressure from their superiors to get 
the cases moving, to stipulate to testi-
mony, to accept depositions, and not to 
go all the way with cases. The really 
good defense iawyers here naturally get 
more requests from accused, 5 and some 
of them are carrying 30 to 40 general 
courts-martial. They simply do not have 
time to do good work. 
A commanding officer doesn't have to 
tell a JAG lawyer ~o make a stipulation, 
or not to request full courts all the 
time. If a colonel or a general lets 
the word filter down that he is worried 
about the case load, JAGs are just going 
to feel that pressure. 
Many of the military lawyers here are 
not even JAGs; they often have an in-
fantry commission. On occasion these 
people have been threatened with assign-
ment to the field if they did not co-
operate with the "program" - or they 
have been made prosecutors rather than 
defense lawyers. 
There are pressures on judges, as well 
as on staff judge advocates and counsel. 
More than one judge has been told that 
his sentences are too light, and that 
discipline suffers. 
One very special case is that of a 
captain, a special courts-martial judge, 
who was just sent from Vietnam. He was 
known for giving what commanders called 
unduly lenient sentences. Months ago he 
was banished from the America! Division 
at Camp Eagle. He had been reprimanded 
on at least one occasion for his sen-
tences by a senior military judge. Just 
two months before he was due to leave 
Vietnam, he was informed that because 
his sentences were light he was being 
moved out of I Corps, in the northern 
area of Vietnam near Da Nang, to Long 
Binh, where there were three or four 
special courts-martial judges. Presum-
ably the effect of his lenient sentences 
would be diluted by the sentences of 
other judges. 
This is not an uncommon occurence. 
Marine Corps lawyers told me that around 
the turn of the year, a large number of 
Aronson 
Addlestone 
Marine captains who had been judges in 
Vietnam were sent back to the States and 
taken out of judicial positions because 
their sentences were too lenient in 
comparison with majors and lieutenant 
colonels who were judging cases. Now the 
trend is towards having just majors and 
above act as judges, or senior captains 
who have shown career potential and can 
be expected to conform to the needs of 
tjle command. 
David's point regarding pressure was 
made this week by no less an authority 
than Major General George S. Prugh, the 
recently appointed Judge Advocate 
General of the Army. He was quoted in 
the Army newspaper, Stars and Stripes, 
as believing that the biggest problem 
in military justice is that it is "too 
darn slow." He went on to say that in 
Vietnam witnesses leave early and 
lawyers concerned with doing a good job 
will try even a special court-martial 
"as if it were going to the Supreme 
Court." I only wish that this was true. 
But his message is not lost on his sub-
ordinates - don't work too hard on 
your cases. 
There is another interesting thing to 
33 
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. credit to the military in Vietnam: 
when an offense becomes common it starts 
to descend on the scale of seriousness. 
For example, marijuana is generally 
accepted now because marijuana is used 
by almost everybody. Rarely will some-
one be court-martialed for a marijuana 
offense alone. It is almost certain to 
be an Article 15 offense here, yet in 
the States it normally would warrant a 
special or general court-martial. 
Now with the heavy use of heroin, men 
are sometimes getting off with non-
judicial punishment. A man was in to see 
me yesterday who offered an Article 
15 for possession of two vials of 
heroin; this is something that two years 
ago would have netted a two or three 
year sentence. And a military lawyer 
from the America! Division told me that 
in July six or seven commanders were 
offering Article I 5s for possession of 
heroin. 
The Anny realizes how common heroin 
is, yet you get both extremes. Some 
commanders offer Article l 5s, while 
others take off all the wraps and con-
duct blatantly illegal searches for 
heroin. And nobody is going to the 
source of the problem. 
Donovan 
Remcho 
Here is a letter that a battalion 
commander just issued about heroin: 
"As of this date I am declaring war on drug 
abuse in this Battalion. In the last five 
days, in a series of seizures, I've confis-
cated 112 vials of heroin - enough to make 
things a little tight. Things are going to get 
a hell of a lot tighter before the problem is 
satisfactorily solved. There will be more 
shakedowns and inspections; the flow of 
traffic in and out of the compound is going to 
be drastically reduced. Officers and senior 
NCOs are now authorized to conduct unannounced 
searches of any man on this compound. 
As I turn down screws more and more, 
you're going to start hurting. If I have to 
hunt you down and catch you, and you refused 
my help, I will put you behind bars as fast as 
I can for as long as I can. The maximum for 
possession of 'smack' is 10 years in a 
federal penitentiary, and I will bring the 
'max.' I don't want to hang anyone but/ will 
solve this problem. Help me solve the drug 
problem by helping me get the monkey off your 
back." 
What is the solution to the heroin 
problem? 
I am not sure what the solution is, 
other than just to get out of Vietnam. 
What really starts heroin usage here is 
this total boredom, being shut off from 
the rest of society, not really fighting 
a war. Most people are rear troops and 
that is where most of the addiction is. 
In addition, I doubt that any honest 
attempts have been made to do anything 
about cutting off the flow of heroin. 
Even now most of the drug raids by 
Vietnamese are just publicity stunts. 
The powers in the government of South 
Vietnam apparently have a financial 
stake in seeing that heroin continues 
to flow. That's just an undocumented 
feeling. 
Amnesty programs are apparently not 
very successful. Gls, particularly 
blacks, find it hard to trust the Army's 
promise of immunity. Although the 
government does not prosecute persons 
who go on amnesty or flunk urinalysis 
tests, reports of drug use often find 
their way into permanent records of one 
sort or another. There are urinalysis 
tests, now given to everyone leaving the 
country and to in-country units at 
random, through a program known as 
"Operation Golden Flow." A user can 
expect little in the way of help. A week 
or two in an amnesty program will do 
little good, especially when drugs are 
often available within the amnesty 
house. 
One of the few effective programs to 
get Gls off of heroin is run by SP4 
Henry Rollins at Long Binh. Rollins, a 
black, and his counsellors appeal to the 
10
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racial identity of blacks: "If you're to the field. Then several days after 
on skag, you're a nigger. You've got to the trial his hardship discharge was 
get off skag if you want to even try to finally approved and his case was 
be a black man." It's tough medicine, brought to the attention of authorities. 
but he has made it work. But the conviction will stay on his 
record. 
Donovan A lot of our clients who are on heroin 
have told us that the reason they have 
switched is that the Army was cracking What about refusals to fight or bear 
down so hard on marijuana that they arms? 
turned to skag because it was non-
detectable. Army officers could smell Addlestone ' Field refusals in Vietnam are handled 
marijuana, but they can't smell heroin. as informally as possible. The com-
Gls will smoke a heroin cigarette manders talk with the men, and if they 
right in front of an officer and he will go back out in the field, they 
never knows what's happening. usually will not be tried. We have been 
involved in seven refusals, almost all· 
Aronson One client said he switched because involving conscientious objectors. One 
"grass is loud, man, you can smell it GI that Henry worked with had actually 
a mile away." filed as a conscientious objector and 
was being sent to the field; he per-
suaded the convening authority to dis-
miss the charges. In my cases, the Gis 
What about racism in Vietnam? had not yet filed. They refused to 
bear arms and were convicted. 
Addlestone You see it everywhere! A black told me 
of going to an Inspector General (JG) Soldiers in Vietnam have been creating 
officer to complain of racial discrimi- "space" for themselves by "[ragging" 
nation in his Air Force unit. The IG officers and enlisted men, by dis-
opened the conversation by asking the obeying orders, by creating their own 
black GI, "Just how many colored boys world with drugs, by emphasizing racial 
do you have in this unit?" pride - has the Army responded with any 
new policy towards giving soldiers in 
Donovan One of the conscientious objectors, a Vietnam more "room "? 
black man, has met with an incredible 
amount of hostility and harassment. He Remcho One situation comes to mind where there 
has been told that if he will withdraw appeared to have been a calculated 
his papers, they will give him a decent attempt to create "more room," as you 
job, but if he won't withdraw his say. Apparently what had happened was 
papers, he will end up being sent back that a commanding officer had been 
to perimeter duty and will be given the tolerating marijuana for several months; 
worst possible job in civilian life, if then he suddenly decided to crack down 
and when he gets out, because he is a and gave some G Is Article 1 Ss for 
conscientious objector. possession of marijuana. Several Gls got 
together and decided to "frag" the 
Remcho Of course you see gross examples, but area - they set off six live fragmen-
it's evident in subtle but nevertheless tation grenades and a couple of people 
crucial situations. were hurt, but not seriously. This was 
One field refusal 6 that I had in- somewhat typical. What they try to do is 
volved a black GI who has ah incredibly warn superiors by setting off "frags." 
bad home situation. His wife had walked Commanders are not operating under the 
out on his kids and he spent nine assumption that there will be a plot to 
months trying to get a reassignment or get them if they get tough with their 
an emergency leave to get back to the men, but they are all particularly aware 
States. Finally, as a desperation that "fragging" exists. They tend to 
measure, he refused to go to the field. hold back just a little because they are 
I called as a hostile witness in that case afraid of someone getting out of hand. 
a white chaplain who on several occasions 
had discouraged the GI and given him Addlestone It is the general feeling that 
wrong advice about regulations, making "fraggings" are spur-of-the-moment 
it almost impossible for him to get back decisions and not calculated attempts to 
to save his family. injure. "Fraggings" usually serve as 
The GI was convicted of refusing to go a "warning." The real killings occur 35 
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when someone has been pushed to his related the trial to a man's right to 
limit; however, the level of tolerance disobey an unlawtul order. There is an 
and civilization erodes rapidly here. eight-hour course on military justice 
and the Geneva convehtion which military 
Donovan There are stories that circulate about lawyers are required to give to all 
officers sleeping with their guns be- troops. Often, however, they face 
neath their beds and having guards hostile audiences and it is not uncommon 
posted ... for the course to be a "fifteen minute 
... and of first sergeants keeping 
special." Most JAG lawyers felt the 
Addlestone verdict was probably supported by the 
hostages or playing musical beds. evidence and that Calley should be 
punished. 
Donovan We are sympathetic to the frustrations 
that lead to an act of "fragging," Aronson Not so the guards at the Da Nang Stock-
although we can't condone throwing a ade. They were most proud of a large 
live grenade at someone. sign proclaiming "Free Lt. Calley" 
posted conspicuously in their office. 
How is plea bargaining used in Vietnam? 
Addlestone I have heard a few soldiers say they 
Addlestone Too often. It's an integral part of the are aware they do not have to obey 
military process everywhere. Plea bar- illegal orders. In fact, the three con-
gaining is widespread except in the Air scientious objectors that we just 
Force, which does not sanction plea finished defending sincerely felt that 
bargaining. the order they were given was illegal. 
Many Gis who are opposed to the war 
Aronson There are many instances where the talk in terms of its illegality. 
accused is being well represented and 
the case ends in a negotiated plea. The 
problem occurs when plea negotiation is What risk does a GI take when he dis-
a cover for laziness. It's a hell of a obeys an order he thinks is illegal? 
lot easier to plead a client than to 
prepare for his defense. We have repre- Remcho I have not spoken to anyone who thought 
sented many troops who were innocent he was going to be shot for disobeying 
and represented by military Ia:wyers who an order. There is a large amount of 
wanted to plead them guilty. The most disobedience of minor orders that goes 
blatant case involved a soldier whose · on without punishment. If a GI takes a 
JAG lawyer got his client a "deal" public position, disobeying an order in 
for a plea to attempted murder. Joe had front of a lot of people, he is maxi-
the case dismissed at a preliminary mizing his chances of being punished. 
hearing. In point here, the UCMJ provides a 
maximum penalty of five years imprison-
Do you think LMDC lawyers are bar- ment and a dishonorable discharge for 
gaining from strength? disobeying orders of a superior officer. 
It has been our experience that most 
Addlestone Yes. Generally, the Staff Judge Advo- disobedience of orders cases - unless 
cate is afraid of having to put up they involve someone like a conscientious 
with an aggressive civilian lawyer; he objector or political activist - go to 
knows we are going to raise more issues special courts-martial, which can give 
than a JAG lawyer will and that he is a maximum of six months confinement. In 
going to have to review a complex case. fact, very few of the special courts-
In many instances, civilian lawyers are martial award maximum punishment even if 
able to get a better bargain. a GI has disobeyed an order to go into 
the field. 
What about the Calley trial and But I still think soldiers take the 
verdict? What has been the effect in matter seriously; it takes a lot to get 
Vietnam? them to disobey an order to go into the 
field. 
Remcho Most Gisin the field were sympathetic Aronson Also, there are a number of well-known 
to Calley. Many felt that once you are ways to which orders can be ducked. One 
out there shooting, you shouldn't have example is "walking the map," in which 
to worry about people looking over your a leader told to move hi.s unit from A 
shoulder all the time. to B acknowledges the order and later 
36 . But I do not think very many people reports to his superior that the order 
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has been carried out.. In fact no one 
moved. A second and more popular avoid-
ance scheme is to respond to a radioed 
order: "You are coming through broken," 
and then, "We cannot read you," when 
in fact the signal is loud and clear. 
ls "winding down" the war reducing 
your operations? 
No, not at this point, because leisure 
time and boredom lead to more offenses. 
Also, many Gis simply refuse to accept 
the authority responsible for this war. 
The work load is always beyond our 
resources; we could have handled a 
thousand cases. Many Gis want civilian 
lawyers. 
Can LMDC hire more lawyers? 
The four lawyers now in country will be 
leaving during November. We will be 
replaced by Howard DeNike of San Fran-
cisco and Edward Kopanski of Phila-
delphia. Susan Thorner, who has just 
finished her first year of law school, 
will work with them. 
LMDC has raised some of the funds 
necessary to continue operating into 
the next year. We are counting on fur-
ther help from foundations and private 
individuals. If anyone is interested in 
making contributions or handling state-
side appeals of cases raised in Vietnam, 
he or she should contact Charles Nesson 
at Harvard Law School. 
As a policy matter, what limitations 
does LMDC have on its own operations? 
The only limits are that we do not get 
involved with overt political activities 
because we would lose our visas and 
that we are not accepting cases defend-
. ing Gis where the victim is Vietnamese. 
One of the reasons that we do not feel . 
bad about not taking cases involving 
Vietnamese victims is the so-called 
"mere gook" rule. In cases tried in 
Vietnam you'll find that someone con-
victed of shooting a U.S. officer or 
GI may get life or 30 years, while 
someone accused of killing a Vietnamese 
will get only a short sentence, if he 
is convicted at all. The Army's ability 
to distinguish between the life of a 
Vietnamese and the life of an American 
is somewhat staggering. 
For example, there was a race riot in 
Qui Nhon several months ago. A GI was 




boy through the head with an MI6 that 
blew the back of his head off. Now if 
the GI had shot another GI with an M 16, 
it would have gone to trial as murder. 
This one went to a special court-martial 
for something like aggravated assault 
or negligent homicide. The most the GI 
could have received was six months. He 
doesn't need our help. 
There also seem to be "mere nigger" 
and "mere pot-head" rules in operation 
in Vietnam. 
What would be the potential of LMDC if 
it had more resources and more lawyers? 
My personal opinion is that there are 
not enough organizations in the States 
that exclusively handle military cases. 
And if they do military cases, they 
have to do them on a fee basis or by 
dividing up the fee cases. I would like 
to see an organization such as LMDC 
expand and have local groups of lawyers 
on salaries located at all the large 
military installations in the States. 
Perhaps a more important question is, 
"Why are there military lawyers?" 
Military and justice are basically 
37 
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incompatible. Commanders have little 
time and Jess patience for the Fourth 
Amendment and the right to counsel, 
particularly in a place like Vietnam 
where they are, to the man, attempting 
to make their reputations as field 
commanders. Being a crusader for the 
Constitution or justice is not a rec-
ognized route to success in the 
military. The commander looks to his 
JAG subordinate as a necessary evil, 
found on the same line on the organi-
zation chart, and often equated with, 
chaplains. A general once commented 
to me that JAGs were "the last guys 
I want to drink with and the first guys 
I want out of the way when it gets 
thick." He went on to say that "no 
lawyer worth anything would stay in the 
service anyway." 
Given the immense tension between the 
necessities of the military and the re-
quirements of elementary justice, 
justice has and will continue to come 
out on the short end as long as it is 
entrusted to the care of the mediocre 
lawyers who, with few exceptions, staff 
the career JAG Corps. The tension and 
the mediocrity, combined with the desire 
for promotion within the JAG ranks, 
has given rise to a prosecutorial sys.-
Addlestone 
Remcho 
tern. If you want to make it as a Staff 
Judge Advocate, you support the prosecu-
tors to the hilt, let the young inexpe-
rienced defense lawyers fend for them-
selves, and above all don't make legal 
waves. This results in the young mili-
tary lawyers who value their indepen-
dence as lawyers getting out. Again, 
there are exceptions, but in the main 
the JAG career corps ranges from 
mediocre to incompetent. 
This incompetence is frightening and 
leads me to question why military law 
need be left to men in uniform. Perhaps 
LMDC's biggest contribution will have 
been the demonstration that civilians 
can practice military law in a war 
zone - and if here, why not everywhere. 
Lawyers who are just lawyers, who do not 
have to r~port in to the men they 
allegedly advise, but who are responsi-
bile only to their clients, the courts 
they practice before, and themselves. 
My work with LMDC leads me to seriously 
question the need for uniformed military 
lawyers. 
How would you define the role of the 
civilian lawyer in Vietnam? · 
LMDC brings different backgrounds into 
the system; the young JAG officer's 
only experience has been in military 
courts. I think we do have an effect on 
military justice by bringing in new 
ideas and challenging accepted in-
justices. We have the ability to go into 
federal court and also to draw on more 
brain power to assist us in appellate 
cases. Most importantly, we offer a 
friendly ear to those Gls who just want 
to talk with a sympathetic civilian. 
An example of what we can do relates 
to three of our clients who are now in 
post-trial confinement. They wanted to 
read some literature which contained a 
variety of points of view on violence 
so that they would be prepared for 
their CO hearings. We took some books 
to the stockade commander, two for 
sexual content and six for political 
content - including Points of 
Rebellion by Mr. Justice Douglas. We 
were told very plainly that political 
literature is not allowed in the stock-
ade because many of the inmates are not 
educated and they might believe what 
they read. We filed suit and the books 
were admitted. 
That reminds me of a story about the 
MACV legal library. MACV is the only 
14





Army library in Vietnam with federal law 
books, although there are Navy and Air 
Force libraries with federal books. 
This is outrageous when you consider all 
the things that are brought into Vietnam 
- truck-loads of ice cream, California 
· lettuce and grapes, and so forth. It is 
too bad the Army cannot bring in three 
or four thousand dollars worth of legal 
books to Da Nang for the lawyers who 
serve the whole northern part of the 
country. If you are a JAG officer in 
Da Nang, aJryou have is the Court of 
Military Review reports, the military 
law books, and maybe a couple of text 
books. 
At any rate, we had a question which 
raised some very serious Miranda 
problems which required federal research 
and I asked to use the MACY library. A 
warrant officer said it was only open to 
people who worked in the MACY complex. 
These are people who have nothing to 
do with criminal justice, so I asked, 
"What about a JAG from up north who 
comes down to look something up?" He 
replied that it was their policy not to 
Jet JAGs use their books because the 
JAGs might get different ideas than 
their chief legal officers back in Da 
Nang. I assume this is an unofficial 
view. MACY has since permitted us 
limited access to the library. 
Military justice still sounds like 
injustice. Is there a new route to 
justice in the military? 
I am not convinced that military justice 
can be equated with injustice; I think 
it is just as bad as any of the justice 
systems in the United States. Juries in 
both systems are drawn from groups that 
are conviction-minded - the career 
officer here is not much different from 
the middle-class jury sitting in judg-
ment of the ghetto black. 
The thing that is most unjust about the 
military system is giving men federal 
convictions for purely disciplinary of-
fenses; for instance, a federal convic-
tion for disobeying an order, for being 
AWOL, or for sleeping on post. I find 
that absolutely incredible. 
JAG officers should be able to act as 
real defense lawyers and more civilian 
lawyers should become involved and start 
challenging some of the accepted abuses. 
Also, legislation is needed to eliminate 
the position of the convening authority 
and the Staff Judge Advocate, and to 
Remcho 
give military judges the same powers 
held by the judges in federal district 
courts. 
I would like to see military judges 
appointed as civilian federal judges 
under Article III. It's also essential 
that they be given All Writs power. And 
the incredible provision permitting a 
commander to overrule a judge on a 
' question of law, though rarely used, has 
got to go. 
Another crucial change must come in 
the composition of military courts. The 
convening authority, who is supposed to 
personally select courts, usually dele-
gates the job to a personnel or legal 
officer. The officer almost invariably 
chooses a court with a lot of senior 
officers. When enlisted men are re-
quested by the accused he usually gets 
a court with E-7s, -8s and -9s 7 . In 
short, a lower-ranked enlisted man has 
almost no chance of getting any peers on 
his court. And most accused are lower-
ranked enlisted men, usually black. If 
courts were randomly selected so as to 
include lower grade enlisted men, I 
think you would find a tremendous in-
crease in the quality of military jus-
tice and the respect enlisted men have 
for military justice. 
Military lawyers as a whole tend to 
try their cases before military judges 
sitting alone. Statistics made available 
by the Appellate Division of the Army 
Judiciary are staggering. From October 
to December 1970, for example, more than 
85% of general courts-martial and 99% 
of special courts-martial adjudging bad 
conduct discharges were tried before a 
judge alone. 
This is largely because full courts 
are "stacked" with senior officers. 
Another reason is pressure from Staff 
Judge Advocates to get cases tried 
quickly; cases before full courts take 
at least twice as long as those tried 
before a judge alone. Finally, many JAGs 
are inexperienced and therefore un-
willing to get into the complexities and 
evidentiary problems of trying a case 
before the military equivalent of a jury. 
We have tried most of our cases before 
full courts and have had pretty good 
results. I think we have had the only 
all lower-ranked enlisted courts in Army 
history. In one case were were able to 
convince an enlightened convening autho-
rity to put lower-ranked enlisted men 
on the court because the accused - two 
blac~ members of the Black Brothers 39 
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United on Whiskey Mountain - felt they 
would be railroaded if they were tried 
by all officers and senior enlisted men. 
The convening authority appointed four 
Specialist Ss (E-Ss) and four officers. 
We managed to challenge all four offi-
cers and wound up with three enlisted 
men - one black E-5 and two white 
Specialist Ss. 
In a second case which I think is 
highly significant, a convening autho-
rity at Long Binh agreed to appoint a 
randomly-selected court. By choosing men 
by computer at random and without regard 
to rank, and then invoking his discre-
tionary power to remove those he felt 
were unqualified, the convening authority 
came up with a panel consisting of a 
major, a captain, an E-7, three E-Ss 
and three E-4s. After voir dire and 
challenges, the final court consisted of 
two E-4s and three E-Ss. They acquited 
SP4 Henry Rollins of assaµlting a ser-
geant major. Although the UCMJ should be 
amended to require some form of random 
selection, the Rollins case shows that 
courts can be randomly selected using 
the current UCMJ. 
In agreeing to rando·m selection, the 
convening authority said he expected 
some decline in the number of convic-
tions and severity of sentences. He felt 
this would be offset by increased troop 
morale and respect for military justice. 
I agree. It is time that commanders 
stop using the UCMJ as a disciplinary 
tool and concentrate instead on earn-
ing the respect of their men. The 
result will be an increase not only in 
the justice afforded an accused, but 
also in the morale and discipline of 
armed forces. 
The issue of pre-trail confinement has 
been a big problem. Recently I found the 
right case where the pre-trial confine-
ment was clearly illegal: the case where 
a man was confined for possession of 
heroin, and to prevent future sale of 
heroin. The Manual for Courts-
Martial is very vague on why a man can 
be placed in pre-trail confinement, and 
the military often uses pre-trail con-
finement for preventive detention. The 
local regulations in Vietnam limit pre-
trial confinement (among other things) 
to cases involving violence - much like 
the new D. C. crime bill. And any 
reasonable reading of this limit 
would not include possession of heroin, 
yet there have been hundreds of people 
put in pre-trial confinement this year 
for sale and possession of heroin. 
We requested an immediate hearing 
before a judge on this issue; it was 
granted and the chief judge of the 
country ruled this type of pre-trial 
confinement was illegal. He now had 
power to order release, but the command 
released my client some five hours after 
the judge's ruling. Subsequently the 
regulation was changed. 
A lot of work could be done in this 
area, and if someone would take a proper 
record to the Court of Military Appeals, 
the issue of pre-trial confinement could 
be clarified. To my knowledge the issue 
of whether a hearing before confinement 
is constitutionally required has never 
been raised. 
The major point of this last dis-
cussion is not the specific issue but 
that there is a great need for civilian 
lawyers to become involved in military 
law. It is ridiculous to ignore the 
effect of 100,000 courts-martial a year. 
These are criminal prosecutions and 
result in federal felony convictions in 
most cases. The JAGs certainly do not 
have the time or the experience to 
reform this system. Civilian lawyers 
could add a great deal to improving 
military law and to insuring that 
military dissidents remain free to 
carry on their work. 
1. Ed. - a non-judicial proceeding, see 
Fuller, Signin' Them Papers, this issue. 
2. Ed. - Staff Judge Advocate General, the 
legal advisor attached to each senior military 
command. 
3. Ed. - Mail sent from within South 
Vietnam. 
4. Ed. - See Fuller, Signin' Them Papers, 
this issue. 
5. Ed. - An accused has the right to re-
quest any JAG who is "reasonably available." 
6. Refusal to fight or bear arms. 
7. Ed. - Senior enlisted men. 
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